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When evaluating the success of causal theories of explanation the focus has typically been
on the legitimacy of causal relations and on putative examples of explanations that we
cannot capture in causal terms. Here I motivate the existence of a third kind of problem:
the difﬁculty of accounting for explanatory disputes. Moreover, I argue that this problem
remains even if the ﬁrst two are settled and that it threatens to undercut one of the central
motivations for causal accounts of explanation, namely, the causal account of the di-
rectionality of scientiﬁc explanation.
1. Introduction. Woodward ð2003Þ and Strevens ð2008Þ offer two of the
most prominent accounts of scientiﬁc explanation to appear in recent years.
They share the feature that they are both, at basis, causal accounts of expla-
nation. Further, Woodward and Strevens both develop these accounts inde-
pendently of any speciﬁc metaphysical account of causation and, indeed,
stay largely neutral on what such an account might look like.
Causal accounts such as these are very attractive for two reasons. First,
the ﬂexibility in the causal relations that they use allows them to account
for a great range of cases of scientiﬁc explanation. For example, Woodward
ð2003, 6Þ is willing to count even equilibrium explanations as causal. Sec-
ond, by invokingmerely general features of causal relations, they solvemanyReceived October 2013; revised January 2014.
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CAUSAL THEORIES OF EXPLANATION 333of the counterexamples that plagued the deductive-nomological account.
For example, many cases of explanatory asymmetry seem to track causal
asymmetries, many cases of explanatory irrelevance seem to track causal ir-
relevance, and many cases of explanatory preemption seem to track causal
preemption.
Kitcher ð1981Þ nicely summarizes why we want an account of scientiﬁc
explanation and what we hope that such an account can do for us. “Firstly,
we would like to understand and to evaluate the popular claim that the nat-
ural sciences do not merely pile up unrelated items of knowledge of more
or less practical signiﬁcance, but that they increase our understanding of the
world. . . . Secondly, an account of explanation ought to enable us to com-
prehend and to arbitrate disputes in past and present science” ð508Þ. In this
article I present a problem for sophisticated causal accounts that stems from
a failure to allow us to comprehend ðand perhaps adjudicateÞ disputes in past
and present science.
2. A Note on Methodology. The idea that a philosophical account of ex-
planation should allow us to arbitrate scientiﬁc disputes might, at ﬁrst
glance, seem rather too ambitious. I think that philosophy has a role to play
here, but the methodology that I will adopt accords philosophical accounts
of explanation a moderate role. I see such accounts as an explication of the
normative commitments that we already employ ðalthough perhaps not ex-
plicitlyÞ in our scientiﬁc practices, rather than as imposing a norm external
to that practice. This is also the project I take the accounts that I discuss in
this article to be concerned with.1 Of course, if we are explicating an implicit
norm then we do not have to accurately capture every instance of what has
been thought to be an explanation. However, this methodology does commit
us to being able to capture central, widely known, and well-understood cases
of scientiﬁc explanation.
Further, and crucially for this article, I take it that this project not only
commits us to delivering the correct verdict in central and well-understood
cases of scientiﬁc explanation but also gives us a pro tanto commitment to
the ﬁrst part of Kitcher’s second criterion. We should be able to compre-
hend as well as let theory arbitrate disputes in past and present science. In-
sofar as these debates are central and well understood, our account should
be able to allow us to understand how the features that are invoked in the
debate are latching on to some aspect that is of importance for explanatory
concerns. If the account that we have developed cannot do this even for the1. Although Strevens ð2008, sec. 1.5Þ calls his project descriptive, I think that this is
largely a terminological difference. Strevens takes his account to be a description ðrather
than an evaluationÞ of our practices, including what determines what we call explan-
atory.
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All ucentral and well-known cases, then we have good reason to think that the
account is not a successful explication of the norms implicit in the prac-
tice at all but part of a more radically revisionary project. In the following
sections, I assume this methodological standpoint and present a challenge
for the dominant causal accounts of explanation that arises from a failure
to allow us to comprehend central debates over the explanatory standing of
certain theories.
3. Challenges to Exclusively Causal Accounts of Explanation. Although
there are several versions of causal accounts of explanation available in the
literature, I will focus the discussion on those developed byWoodward ð2003Þ
and Strevens ð2008Þ. They are good representatives for causal accounts in
general since they provide two of the most sophisticated developments avail-
able and yet take strikingly different approaches.
Strevens’s account starts with a metaphysical assumption that there are
relations of causal inﬂuence that his theory takes as an unanalyzed starting
point. On the basis of these, we understand our explanatory practices as aim-
ing to show what made a difference to the causal production of the phenom-
enon in question and how it did so. Strevens’s kairetic account is constructed
to give a careful way of selecting the explanatorily relevant causal inﬂu-
ences—the difference-making ones—from the basis of all the causal inﬂu-
ences for a given phenomenon. Although the notion of causal inﬂuences is
liberally construed, it is nonetheless a substantive component in Strevens’s
account since it allows him to address the directionality of explanation in a
causal way. Whether or not one takes the relation of explanation to be anti-
symmetrical—so that if one fact, event, and so on, plays a role in explaining
another, it is not the case that the other plays a role in explaining the one—
there are still many cases to illustrate that the relation of explanation is not
symmetrical.2 Many such cases are by now familiar; for example, while it
seems as if the height of a ﬂagpole can explain the length of its shadow, it
does not seem as if the length of the shadow can explain the height of the
ﬂagpole.3 Similarly, while the presence of a distant mass can play a role in
explaining the motion of some body, the motion of that body does not
explain ðalthough it could play a role in predictingÞ the mass of the distant
body.
Causal accounts of explanation identify the direction of explanation
with the direction of causation and thereby identify the explanatory
asymmetry with a causal asymmetry. This is the crucial constraint that
Strevens places on the theories of causal inﬂuence that are compatible with2. In order to keep the terminology already in use, I will write about explanation being
asymmetrical ðin the ordinary but not the mathematical senseÞ to capture this.
3. This case was put forward ðwith slightly different detailsÞ by Bromberger ð1966Þ.
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CAUSAL THEORIES OF EXPLANATION 335his account. His model of explanation demands of causal relations only
“just what is needed, and no more, to provide a causal resolution of the
explanatory asymmetries” ðStrevens 2008, 35Þ.
Woodward’s account of causal explanation starts from a completely dif-
ferent point of view by taking inspiration from manipulability theories
of causation. Explanation is now a matter of “exhibiting systematic patterns
of counterfactual dependence” ðWoodward 2003, 191Þ. The counterfactuals
that are relevant are those that show how the target system would behave
under certain manipulations ðor rather under, to use Woodward’s technical
notion, interventionsÞ. The idea is, roughly, that explanatory relationships
show how the variable being explained would change under manipulations
of the variables doing the explaining.
Although it is not apparent at ﬁrst glance, Woodward’s solution to the
asymmetry problem also relies crucially on the asymmetry of causal rela-
tions ðas will become clearer in sec. 3.2Þ. In Woodward’s account we see
causal notions represented by directed graphs where a directed edge rep-
resents a particular type of causal relation. “A directed graph is an ordered
pair hV, Ei where V is a set of vertices that serve as the variables repre-
senting the relata of the causal relation and E a set of directed edges con-
necting these vertices. A directed edge from vertex or variable X to vertex
or variable Ymeans that X directly causes Y ” ðWoodward 2003, 42Þ. The no-
tion of a direct cause is spelled out in terms of interventions, which them-
selves, as we will see below, are understood by making use of causal no-
tions captured by the directed graphs. “A necessary and sufﬁcient condition
for X to be a direct cause of Y with respect to some variable set V is that
there be a possible intervention on X that will change Y . . . when all other
variables in V besides X and Y are held ﬁxed at some value by interven-
tions” ð55Þ.
Although it is tempting to think of Woodward’s interventionist account
as involving a conceptual reduction, in order for this circularity to not be
vicious, it is crucial that it does not. While we need to make use of causal
reasoning to ﬁgure out whether X causes Y, we do not, in general, need to
assume that we already know what the causal relationship between X and Y
is. Here too, in the end, causal relations provide an unreduced foundation
for the account. With these quick summaries of the relevant aspects of the
two accounts on the table, I turn to the case that will occupy the rest of this
article.
3.1. Newton’s Theory of Universal Gravitation. On any reasonable
measure Newton’s theory of universal gravitation now stands as a great ex-
planatory achievement. The theory of universal gravitational attraction was
extremely successful, showing a wide range of phenomena to be of the same
type and predicting the behavior of different types of systems from a fewThis content downloaded from 128.243.002.034 on July 11, 2016 09:27:19 AM
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All ulaws. However, the theory was not accepted as clearly explanatory when it
was ﬁrst proposed. The seeming appeal to action at a distance was thought
to be troubling and raised questions as to whether the theory really could
have identiﬁed the physical causes of the motions predicted. This debate
over the explanatory status of the theory, famously captured in the Leibniz-
Clarke correspondence, is a very good candidate for a debate that we
would like our theories of explanation to both adjudicate and help us un-
derstand.
The difﬁculty facing causal accounts of explanation is that they force us
to rule out certain prima facie plausible ways of understanding this debate.4
If we accept the methodological restrictions of section 2 together with the
claim that this a central and well-researched case of disagreement over sci-
entiﬁc explanation, then this debate is a test for our theories of scientiﬁc
explanation. For reasons that will become clear in section 4, it is also an
interesting case to focus on since it blocks certain common argumentative
moves that we are tempted to take when accepting a causal account of ex-
planation.
Put simply, the problem of understanding this debate from a causal
explanatory perspective stems from the reluctance, on both sides, to take
there to be a straightforward causal explanation given by the theory. Ob-
jections that were brought against the theory by, for example, Leibniz partly
follow the pattern expected by theories of causal explanation. Leibniz re-
jects the explanatory status of the theory on the grounds that it does not
provide a causal account. Moreover, this rejection is based on the failure of
a causal interpretation of the theory to adhere to a mechanistic conception of
causation by invoking unmediated action at a distance. These objections to
action at a distance were known to Newton, and he was not insensitive to
them. Whether or not he privately accepted the restriction that causal ex-
planations should be local, in several places of his writings we ﬁnd him
struggling with the problem of separating the search for causes from the
search for laws, and he stresses both that he does not have a causal account
and the priority of a law-based one. “Mathematics requires an investigation of
those quantities of forces and their proportions that follow from any con-
ditions that may be supposed. Then, coming down to physics, these pro-
portions must be compared with the phenomena, so that it may be found out
which conditions ½or laws of forces apply to each kind of attracting bodies.
And then, ﬁnally, it will be possible to argue more securely concerning the
physical species, physical causes, and physical proportions of these forces”
ðNewton 1999, Principia, Bk. I, scholium to proposition 69, 588–89Þ.4. I make a much more detailed historical argument for the interpretative views that I
merely take to be plausible in this article in Jansson ð2013Þ.
This content downloaded from 128.243.002.034 on July 11, 2016 09:27:19 AM
se subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
CAUSAL THEORIES OF EXPLANATION 337This looks like it should be good news for causal accounts, since New-
ton seems to accept the view that Strevens requires, namely, that there are
relations of causal inﬂuence at the foundational level. Yet Newton both
clearly rejected the suggestion put forward by Leibniz that his theory was an
instrumental and nonexplanatory one and in several places stresses the
causal agnosticism of his account ðsee Leibniz 1961/2008, 258; Newton
1961/2008, 287Þ. “Hitherto we have explained the phaenomena of the
heavens and of our sea by the power of gravity, but have not yet assigned
the cause of this power. . . . I have not been able to discover the cause of
those properties of gravity from phaenomena, and I frame no hypotheses”
ðNewton 1995, Principia, Bk. III, General Scholium, 442Þ.
Taking this passage on face value, Newton seems to hold that the theory
of universal gravitation can supply explanations from the laws that he has
identiﬁed but that these explanations are compatible with a causal agnos-
ticism.5 Within the methodological framework of section 2, this puts pres-
sure on our accounts of scientiﬁc explanation to make sense of this, at least
seemingly conceptually coherent, position. However, this is harder than it
might appear at ﬁrst glance. In particular, since the explanatory status is
tied to the causal one, in the face of agnosticism about the causal relations—
in response to the worries about causal action at a distance—we are forced
into an explanatory agnosticism too.
Both Woodward and Strevens consider the case of Newtonian gravity
in some detail. In the quote below, Woodward gives what I take to be a
common debunking story as to why worries about action at a distance were
taken to be relevant. The debunking story is essentially one that notes that,
while many causal interactions are spatiotemporally continuous processes,
there is no good reason to take this to be an a priori constraint on causal
relations. The suggestion is that this is the mistake that one can make, and
that people did make, thereby mistakenly ending up taking action at a dis-
tance to be worrying for the explanatory status of Newtonian gravity since
it constitutes a worry about the existence of a requisite causal relation.5. He
All It is perfectly true that Newton himself regarded this feature ½action at a
distance as unsatisfactory or at least as indicating an important incom-
pleteness in his theory, but there seems no reason to deny that his theory
describes a causal relationship between the two bodies, and this seems to
have been the conclusion reached by most physicists a generation or two
after Newton . . . If . . . a causal interaction involves transfer of energy-
momentum in accord with a conservation law, that interaction will be
mediated by spatiotemporally continuous processes that propagate at ﬁ-
nite velocity. However, although many causal interactions involve energy-re I will only rely on the claim that this is a reasonable interpretation.
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All use submomentum transfer from cause to effect, not all do. . . . Moreover, both
Lorentz invariance and the conservation of energy-momentum are clearly
empirical truths and not a priori constraints that follow just from the no-
tion of causation. ðWoodward 2003, 148ÞWhile I think that it is correct that there are no a priori constraints on
causal relations that rule out action at a distance, this diagnosis seems to
overlook an important aspect of the case. In order to reasonably doubt
whether one has a causal explanation of a given phenomenon, it is not re-
quired that it be conceptually incoherent for there to be causation of the
kind required by the causal explanation under consideration. All that is re-
quired is that one has an empirically based theory of what causal inﬂuences
in the actual world are like that does not allow for the kind of inﬂuences
that the theory postulates. Moreover, to have held a theory of causal inﬂu-
ences that rules out action at a distance seems perfectly responsible and not
to necessarily involve any conceptual confusion. Hesse notes this in her
discussion of Bacon’s lists of the various phenomena for which he can ﬁnd
no mechanical explanation. “The phenomena which he is most ready to
ascribe to action at a distance without any material medium are those which
savour most of witchcraft, magic, astrology, and telepathy, and since these
were the beliefs most discredited by the subsequent advance of physical
science, the fact that action at a distance was discredited with them is not
surprising” ðHesse 1961/1965, 95Þ.
This way of viewing action-at-a-distance worries when it comes to causal
explanation acknowledges that it is conceptually possible to have action at
a distance. What is worrying about postulating it is that it does not conform
to our theory of how causation works. Moreover, a causal confusion does
not do justice to Newton’s resistance to accept an instrumentalist interpre-
tation of his theory. If a mistaken a priori commitment to all causal inﬂu-
ences being local was what was driving Newton, we would, on causal ac-
counts of explanation, expect him to also deny the explanatory status of
the theory ðon pain of conceptual confusionÞ, but this is not what we see.
Rather, he seems to be opposed to proponents of a speciﬁc causal theory
of explanation while agreeing ðor at least allowingÞ that he did not have
a complete causal explanation. If we adopt a causal account of explanation,
what otherwise seems like a sensible position to hold—namely, that the laws
are explanatory even given agnosticism about the causal mechanism—be-
comes conceptually incoherent.
This case is particularly interesting because the considerations involved
in it generalize. We are familiar with worries about the existence of appro-
priate causal relations that stem not directly from our concept of causation
but rather from our empirically founded theories of the nature of causal in-
ﬂuence. After all, if we hold, for example, that no causal inﬂuences can prop-This content downloaded from 128.243.002.034 on July 11, 2016 09:27:19 AM
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CAUSAL THEORIES OF EXPLANATION 339agate faster than the speed of light, we probably do not take this restriction
to be part of the concept of causation but rather take it to be supported by
the theory of special relativity. That is, here we recognize a distinction
between our concept of causation and our theory of causal inﬂuences.
Moreover, here too we ﬁnd similar debates over the explanatory status of,
for example, certain quantum predictions such as the correlations found
between measurements on two particles prepared in an entangled state and
then separated such that no signal traveling below superluminal speeds
could connect them. All of these examples are cases in which, at least at ﬁrst
glance, we can have a greater conﬁdence in the explanatory status of our
theories than we have in them describing causal relationships.
If we take the above seriously as a sensible reading of a central historical
case ðwith extensions to other contemporary casesÞ, then it is hard to defend
ruling this out as a conceptual impossibility by our account of explanation
or causation. This cannot be a knockdown defeater of such accounts, but it
does put pressure on these accounts to come up with a reasonable debunking
story of how this kind of conceptual confusion arises, and, given the meth-
odological view proposed in section 2, to simply deny the explanatory status
of the laws is not an option. In the next section, I consider some sugges-
tions and sharpen the problem by bringing out the difﬁculties faced when
trying to accommodate this case within a causal explanatory framework.
3.2. A First Pass at Some Solutions. An immediate solution that sug-
gests itself is that Strevens could argue that the explanation ﬁts the criteria
for being a particular “given-that” kind of explanation and that Woodward
could argue that Newton would accept that his account is causal in the
broader sense of the term employed by Woodward but not causal in the
narrower sense of the term used in the action-at-a-distance debate. I address
the second suggestion ﬁrst. This suggestion has some initial plausibility
since it seems reasonable to say that Newton would have agreed that, if you
could change the mass of one of two gravitating bodies, then the motion of
the other body would alter in predictable ways. This seems to capture the
intuition behind Woodward’s notion of causation, so perhaps these kinds
of counterfactuals can, on their own, give us a broader notion of causation
that Newton could embrace even in the face of agnosticism about the more
speciﬁc causal processes and their nature.
However, this intuitive gloss cannot be borne out by Woodward’s ac-
count. The reasons for this go back all the way to the motivations that
pushed us toward abandoning the deductive-nomological account and to-
ward causal accounts of explanation in the ﬁrst place, namely, the prospect
of using the directionality of the causal relation to capture the directional-
ity of the explanatory relation. To achieve this, Woodward’s account gives
the relevant counterfactuals a causal underpinning. It is crucial that not allThis content downloaded from 128.243.002.034 on July 11, 2016 09:27:19 AM
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All ucounterfactuals count for the purposes of causal explanation; rather, only
the ones that have to do with what would happen under interventions of a
certain kind count. However, the application of the notion of an intervention
on X with respect to Y demands that we have settled questions about causal
relations between the variables in the variable set to a large enough extent
to be able to answer questions about the existence of directed paths. Here
causal notions enter the picture.se subI is an intervention variable for X with respect to Y if and only if I meets
the following conditions:
ðIVÞ
I1: I causes X.
I2: I acts as a switch for all the other variables that cause X. That is,
certain values of I are such that when I attains those values, X
ceases to depend on the values of other variables that cause X
and instead depends only on the value taken by I.
I3: Any directed path from I to Y goes through X. That is, I does not
directly cause Y and is not a cause of any causes of Y that are
distinct from X except, of course, for those causes of Y, if any,
that are built into the I–X–Y connection itself: that is, except for
ðaÞ any causes of Y that are effects of X . . . and ðbÞ any causes
of Y that are between I and X and have no effect on Y indepen-
dently of X.
I4: I is ðstatisticallyÞ independent of any variable Z that causes Y
and that is on a directed path that does not go through X.
ðWoodward 2003, 98Þ
The notion of a directed path is deﬁned relative to a directed graph ðwhere a
directed edge represents a direct cause, as we saw aboveÞ. If there is a
directed edge between X1 and X2 and between X2 and X3, and so on, to Xn,
then this is a directed path from X1 to Xn.
Now we can try to evaluate the earlier intuitive claim that, if the mass of
one of the bodies were to be changed, then the movement of the other body
would change. In order to evaluate this claim, we need to adjudicate the
claim as to whether there is an intervention on the mass with respect to, say,
the acceleration that is such that any directed path from the intervention
variable to the acceleration variable goes through the mass variable. At ﬁrst
it seems as if this is impossible to answer without more information about
what the intervention is, and, as Woodward notes, it seems quite possible
that there is no such intervention that is physically or nomologically pos-
sible. That would be bad news for a solution to the problem along these lines,
since now we should be agnostic or even skeptical as to whether the ex-
planatory counterfactuals hold. Woodward addresses this worry directly
ðalthough in a slightly different guiseÞ and responds that the interventionThis content downloaded from 128.243.002.034 on July 11, 2016 09:27:19 AM
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evaluate the relevant counterfactuals from the theory itself.All There must be a way of disentangling—perhaps merely conceptually or
analytically rather than in actuality—the effect on E of changing just C
from the effects on E of changes in other potentially confounding var-
iables, including direct effects from the intervention process itself. . . .
Newtonian gravitational theory and mechanics themselves provide the
needed basis. Although it may be true that any actual physical process that
changes the position of the moon will also directly inﬂuence the tides,
Newtonian theory and familiar rules about the composition of forces tell
us how to subtract out any direct inﬂuence from such a process so that we
can calculate just what the effect of say, doubling the moon’s orbit ðand no
other changesÞ would be on the tides, even though it also may be true that
there is no way of actually realizing this effect alone. In other words, New-
tonian theory itself delivers a determinate answer to questions about what
would happen to the tides under an intervention that doubles the moon’s
orbit, and this is enough for counterfactual claims about what would hap-
pen under such interventions to be legitimate and to allow us to assess their
truth. ðWoodward 2003, 131ÞThis is close to the intuitive idea that the laws themselves deliver the
required answer that supports the counterfactual and hence the explanation.
I think that this is exactly what we want to say for the intuitive counter-
factual, but Woodward’s account cannot accommodate this. Woodward is
also careful not to say this. After all, we know that when it comes to the laws
of the theory we get a symmetry of prediction that is not reﬂected in our
judgments about explanation. This is the problem that causal accounts in
general, and in Woodward’s account the notion of an intervention in par-
ticular, are supposed to address. While we can take the theory to give us
answers to these claims, on Woodward’s account we have to have already
given the theory a causal interpretation for it to do so.
In the face of the kind of causal agnosticism that Newton seems to accept,
we cannot, therefore, run the same story of how the theory itself delivers
the required answer to the question whether there is ðconceptuallyÞ the right
kind of intervention. Moreover, we cannot even claim that Newton, since
he is committed to there being a causal process of some kind, is committed to
there being an unknown causal structure that would support the existence of
an intervention of the right kind. Without the causal information at hand, we
simply cannot judge whether there is a conceptually possible intervention
that fulﬁlls criteria I2 and I3 above and whether there are interventions that
will ﬁx the appropriate variables at some values. At a deeper level, we cannot
even, without more knowledge, judge whether the variable choice is such asThis content downloaded from 128.243.002.034 on July 11, 2016 09:27:19 AM
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All uto allow for the concept of an intervention to be successfully applied at all.
The idea that the notion of an intervention can fail, even when intuitively
plausible, in light of more information about the theory, is what underpins
Woodward’s rejection of the idea that an intervention on the spin of one
particle with respect to the other in a quantum entangled state is available
ðHausman andWoodward 1999, 566Þ. Yet here, too, we might want to claim
that once we have measured the spin of one particle this explains the spin
state of the other.
Strevens also addresses the case of Newtonian gravity directly, and I
think that his account goes further toward being able to accommodate the
kind of view that I sketched in section 3.1.6 He notes that we could try to take
what he calls the post-Newtonian explanation of Kepler’s laws to be simply
the claim that “ﬁrst, . . . all change in planetary motion, is caused by masses
and their arrangement; second, . . . the dependence between the acceleration
a of any particular body due to another body of mass M and distance r takes
the approximate form a 5 GM/r2; and third, . . . the accelerations due to
different bodies compose through simple vector addition” ðStrevens 2008,
327–28Þ. For our purposes here, what is particularly interesting is the ﬁrst
and the second of these claims. If we want to allow for a causal agnosticism
onNewton’s part, we have to be careful in howwe understand the claim that
all change in planetary motion is caused by masses and their arrangements.
Newton clearly thinks that the cause acts in a way proportional to mass, but
it does not follow straightforwardly from this that the mass itself is the
cause. Even more strongly, it does not follow that we have identiﬁed all that
is causally relevant, or even essential, if we allow that mass is a causally
salient variable. Finally, we have to be careful in how we understand the
dependence between acceleration a and the body of mass M at a distance r.
In order to get the asymmetry of dependence in a causal way, here we need
to assume that M and r causally inﬂuence a but not vice versa.
If we take this to be the only causal information, then this way of think-
ing about the explanation lets too much in. If all we needed in order to have
an explanation were to identify a causally salient variable and to then cor-
rectly describe some aspect of the formal relationship, we would get ex-
planations rather cheaply. Strevens notices this when he says that such a
post-Newtonian explanation would probably not be cohesive. “I suspect,
however, that the post-Newtonian model is not cohesive. By specifying
only the form of the causal relationship between mass and planetary ac-
celeration, the model black-boxes the relationship. Different implementa-
tions of this inverse-square black box may be causally quite different from
one another” ðStrevens 2008, 328Þ. To sharpen Strevens’s point here, the6. I am setting aside the fact that we now think that Newton’s theory is not true. This is,
however, part of the focus of Strevens’s discussion.
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CAUSAL THEORIES OF EXPLANATION 343formal constraint relating the salient cause to the phenomenon of interest
could be actively misleading as to the causal production of the phenome-
non while still remaining accurate. Instead, Strevens suggests that we can
relegate black boxes to the explanatory framework ðthat is, very roughly,
what the explanation is taking as a givenÞ and thereby let them stand in for
some speciﬁc mechanisms. “When a frameworked mechanism is black-
boxed, the black box itself stands in for the mechanism, which is to say,
it functions as a placeholder for a certain, determinate mechanism, either
known or unknown. ðIn the case where the mechanism is unknown, it must
of course be placed in the framework by a phrase or intention that picks it
out indirectly, for example ‘the mechanism that is actually responsible for
such and such a behavior of such and such a component of the system.’Þ”
ðStrevens 2008, 152Þ. This gets closer to an account that could make sense
of Newton’s position. After all, he does think that there is a causal account
to be given, but one that is unknown. Perhaps we can then black-box that
causal mechanism as part of the explanatory framework and instead think
of the explanations offered as why, given the actual mechanism, we ﬁnd
the movements of the planets to be such and such.7
The problem with this is that none of it, on its own, seems to get us to the
stage that Strevens rightly notices is something that we need, namely, the
causal interpretation of the formal constraint that allows us to give a causal
account of the asymmetry problem. Strevens makes this explicit when he
spells out the black-boxing as changing the question to be one of why “given
an inverse-square dependence” ðStrevens 2008, 329Þ we see the kind of
behavior of the planets that we do. Here the dependence, and so the di-
rectionality, itself has been built into the framework. This leaves open the
question how it is that we are able to place the dependence in the framework
to start with. To make this seem like a justiﬁed move, we need to have some
way of extracting the directionality from the formal relationship.
Even if we take Strevens to be giving a metaphysical account of the kind
that Kim ð1994Þ has in mind, this account is still beholden to our epistemic
limitations. That is, it is not enough to claim that we take there to be a cer-
tain relation, we need to show how such a claim could be backed up ðat least
well enough to account for our level of explanatory conﬁdenceÞ. Finally,
under the assumption that we take this case seriously as one of casual agnos-
ticism, our understanding of the asymmetry of the dependence cannot be rel-
egated to our causal understanding of the theory. Here, then, is the rub. The
advantage of basing the kairetic account on a primitive notion of causal in-
ﬂuence was that it allowed us to make use of the causal solution to the asym-
metry problem. Nowwe have a situation in which we have greater conﬁdence
in the laws than we do in our knowledge about the causal mechanisms. Rather7. Here I use the term “mechanism” in Strevens’s contemporary sense.
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All uthan using our causal knowledge to impose the required directionality on the
laws, we seem to be using the laws to help us ﬁgure out features of the causal
mechanism. We still need to ﬁnd some way in which we can justify imposing
the directionality on the formal relationship captured by the law, butwe cannot
directly appeal to our knowledge of the causal inﬂuences. In the order of the
investigation that has been proposed, that would put the cart before the horse.
4. TheProblemof SimpleEcumenism. So far I have argued that the causal
accounts on the table cannot, at least as they stand, easily capture a seem-
ingly sensible way of understanding a central case of a dispute over the
explanatory standing of a theory in the history of science. However, both
Woodward and Strevens stress that their accounts only cover causal expla-
nations and allow that there can be other kinds of explanations available.
Here I argue that this does not allow us to escape the problem. If they fail to
capture this ðand similarÞ caseðsÞ, it threatens to undercut one of the main
motivations for causal accounts of explanation.
The question that is obliquely raised through the example of section 3 is
whether it is possible to have explanations, in this case law-based ones,
independently of causal knowledge.8 That the intuitive pull toward accept-
ing natural laws as one available foundation for explanations is strong is,
of course, not a surprise. It is one of the features that made the deductive-
nomological account attractive. One of the central motivations for aban-
doning such a view was the difﬁculty in accounting for the asymmetry of
explanation and the ease by which causal accounts capture this. However,
in order to succeed in diagnosing and remedying this problem, causal ac-
counts have to rule out certain kinds of explanatory pluralism. In particular,
allowing both laws and causal relationships to act as genuine and inde-
pendent explanatory relations destroys the causal solution.9 The causal di-
agnosis only works if we demand that only causal relations do explanatory
work. Otherwise we have not yet accounted for why, for example, the ap-
plication of the laws to derive the mass of a central body from the motion of
an orbiting body does not explain why the central body has that mass, as
opposed to merely not being a causal explanation.10 This blocks the simple8. In the rest of this section, I focus on law-based explanation since that is what I take to
be at stake in the example in sec. 3.1. However, the problem is more general since it
concerns any noncausal explanations.
9. A causal account could, of course, allow that laws can do explanatory work, but to keep
the solution to the asymmetry problem, the ability of laws to do so has to be parasitic upon
the ðor aÞ causal explanation. That is, the laws are not independently explanatory.
10. This is a problem for any account that is prescriptive and that is permissive about the
explanatory relations in this way. This means that is also a challenge for the large
literature on mechanistic explanations, which typically relies on causal notions in this
permissive way. See, e.g., Machamer, Darden, and Craver ð2000, 2, 6Þ, and for an ex
This content downloaded from 128.243.002.034 on July 11, 2016 09:27:19 AM
se subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.ed-
u/t-and-c).
CAUSAL THEORIES OF EXPLANATION 345move of merely allowing that there are noncausal explanations as a way of
trying to understand the explanatory disagreement.
Causal accounts of explanation could try to delineate a domain where we
have causal explanations rather than law-based ones. If we can do so in a
way that is not ad hoc, we could allow laws to do explanatory work out-
side this domain without destroying the solution to the asymmetry problem
within this domain. This is the strategy that I take Woodward to employ.
Woodward ð2003, sec. 5.9Þ is clear that he does not claim to have an account
that covers all cases of explanation and explicitly discusses mathematical
explanation and mathematical dependence as exceptions. Moreover, he pro-
vides a suggested delineation. “Roughly, any explanation that proceeds by
showing how an outcome depends ðwhere the dependence in question is not
logical or conceptualÞ on other variables or factors counts as causal” ð6Þ.
However, this delineation will not do the job of allowing us to understand
the case of explanations from Newton’s law of gravity.11 After all, this is not
a case in which the dependence in question seems to be mathematical,
conceptual, or logical.
Strevens allows for there to be noncausal explanations, but he takes such
explanations to demand an underlying asymmetric relationship. In partic-
ular, he mentions the possibility of mathematical dependence and Railton’s
example of the stopping point of stellar collapse.12 However, he does not give











All What relation holds between the law and the arrest, then, in virtue of which
the one explains the other? Let me give a partial answer: the relation is,
like causal inﬂuence, some kind of metaphysical dependence relation. I no
more have an account of this relation than I have an account of the inﬂu-
ence relation, but I suggest that it is the sort of relation that we say “makes
things happen.” For example, because this ðasymmetricÞ dependence rela-
tion holds between the exclusion principle and the arrest, we are apt to say
that the exclusion principle makes the arrest happen. ðStrevens 2008, 178Þhis delineation is also similar to the one suggested by Woodward and Hitchcock
, 6–7Þ.
iscussed in Lewis ð1986Þ, but attributed to Peter Railton.
reliance on Woodward’s account in the mechanistic literature, see Craver ð2006
72Þ. It is also a challenge for Bokulich ð2008, 2011Þ, which she takes on in
lich ð2012Þ, as well as for anyone developing the ideas of structural explanation
in Clifton ð1998Þ or Hughes ð1989/2003Þ into a prescriptive account. Hughes
/2003, 198Þ gives up on a prescriptive account of explanation, while Clifton
, 19–20Þ discusses broader frameworks. The point here is only that one needs
such broader framework in order to be ecumenical if one is to keep a prescriptive
nt of scientiﬁc explanation.
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All uEven if we are happy to invoke a causal primitive in our theories, we should
be concerned by ﬁnding that there are examples within the same domain
that do not allow us to use the causal solution to the problem of asymmetry.
Once we give up the causal solution that works by identifying the direction
of explanation ðat least in a non–ad hoc domainÞ with the direction of cau-
sality, we have simply reintroduced the problem. We now need a new so-
lution to this problem that is noncausal.
The case that I have been pressing in the previous sections is particularly
challenging since it puts pressure on the idea that a causal solution to the
asymmetry could work even within a neatly delineated domain, such as all
explanations of physical events. Here we have a domain where we would
expect to ﬁnd causal explanations and where Newton expected that such
explanations were there to be found. After all, explanations of individual
motion are particularly well suited for causal explanations, and yet we seem
to be able to make sense of having a kind of explanation without knowledge
of the causal production of the phenomenon. This means that this case
applies also to the view that is put forward by Saatsi and Pexton ð2013Þ.
They too notice the tension in Woodward’s account but conclude that it can
be alleviated by taking causal explanations to provide the solution to asym-
metry problems in the case of particular event explanations but that the
intuition of asymmetry is fragile or nonexistent when it comes to explana-
tions of regularities ðand so presumably we do not need causal information
to solve the problem hereÞ. Whether or not we agree that the explanations
of regularities have this feature, the case that I have been focusing on here
is easily construed as a particular explanation as much as a regularity one.
After all, this is a putative explanation of the particular motions of the par-
ticular bodies in our solar system ðit is an explanation of “our heavens and
our sea”Þ.
5. Conclusion. There are several ways to meet the challenge of this article.
One way is to try to give a debunking account of the intuition that it makes
sense to hold a position such as the one that I have ascribed to Newton. I
cannot rule such an option out. However, I have tried to stress here that
given that we accept a methodology in which we take our clues from the
central kinds of explanations and the central kinds of explanatory debates
that we have seen in the sciences, we incur a burden to at least give a de-
bunking account that shows how the features that lead us to take the law-
based explanations as explanatory roughly track some explanatorily rele-
vant features. Finally, I hope to have convinced you of the difﬁculties that
face the most straightforward strategies for accounting for this case that are
available to causal accounts in general and to Woodward’s and Strevens’s
accounts in particular.This content downloaded from 128.243.002.034 on July 11, 2016 09:27:19 AM
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CAUSAL THEORIES OF EXPLANATION 347Although causal explanations seem ubiquitous, we cannot escape the
problem of explanatory asymmetry by merely appealing to causal asym-
metry, even in these cases. For this solution to work, we need to assume that
no other kind of explanation is available, and as long as such explanations
cannot be ruled out in the domain in question, we cannot escape the work of
giving a more general solution to this problem.
There are, of course, different ways of tackling this problem. One is to
give up on the idea of a general, prescriptive account of explanation alto-
gether and accept something like van Fraassen’s ð1980, 132–34Þ view that
explanation is, through and through, a pragmatic phenomenon. On the other
hand, we can keep the central intuition fromWoodward’s and Strevens’s ac-
counts, namely, that to explain is to track relations of dependence or inﬂuence,
but take on the challenge from Lipton. “The existence of non-causal ex-
planations show that a causal model of explanation cannot be complete. One
reaction would be to attempt to expand the notion of causation to some
broader notion of ‘determination’ that would encompass the non-causal cases
ðRuben 1990: 230–3Þ. This approach hasmerit, but it will be difﬁcult to come
up with such a notion that we understand even as well as causation” ðLipton
2004, 32Þ.
Here I have argued that if we wish to maintain a prescriptive account
with even a fairly moderate explanatory pluralism when it comes to the
relations that can do explanatory work, then we have no easy way to avoid
taking on something like this challenge. The trouble for causal accounts is
far more serious than one of merely being incomplete. Finally, I take the
way forward to be to examine the cases of explanatory asymmetry at hand
and determine what information our judgments of asymmetry stem from. If
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